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SPEEDY JUSTICE FOR THE LITIGANT:
SOUND JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE
PROVINCE?
By R. A. MACDONALD*
The postwar years have produced an explosion of litigation in Ontario.
To cope with this growing reliance upon judicial settlement of disputes, the
total number of High Court and County Court judges was increased from 90
in 1961 to 154 in 1976. Yet greater resort to the courts is not uniquely a trial
court phenomenon; from 1967 through 1976 the number of cases heard annually by the Court of Appeal grew from about 750 to approximately 1200.2
It is in the latter Court that the problem of overcrowding has become most
acute.
During the course of this expansion in appellate litigation, two remedial
measures were undertaken to relieve the pressure on each justice of appeal:
in 1972 the Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice was created,8 and
during 1973 and 1974 four additional judges were named to the Court of
Appeal, bringing its total membership to fourteen. However, neither the deflection of most statutory appeals4 and many interlocutory appeals to the
Divisional Court, nor the expansion of the Court of Appeal has succeeded in
reducing the workload of each member of the latter tribunal.
The alternative to an ever increasing workload for each justice could be
a greatly expanded appellate bench, but projections of future resort to the
Court of Appeal indicate that by the year 2001, from twenty-five to thirtytwo justices will be needed to staff the Court. 5 Seeing a threat to the efficient
functioning of the appellate process in both of these alternatives, i.e., an

0 Copyright, 1978, R. A. Macdonald.
' Mr. Macdonald is Associate Professor of Law, University of Windsor.
'This phenomenon has been well documented. It is not, however, a problem unique
to Ontario. See generally the symposium of judicial opinion on appellate reform in
(1976), 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 419; and Symposium on Judicial Administration (1975),

3 Hofstra L. Rev. 647. For comments on the situation in Ontario, see A. Linden, The
Law's Delay (1971), 5 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 96; J. Sopinka, The Proposed Merger of Courts (1974), 8 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 160; and
C. Barr, Patterns and strategies of court administrationin Canadaand the United States
(1977), 11(2) Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 79.
2 These figures are derived from a graph presented in the Report on the Attorney
General's Committee on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ontario
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1977) at 8-9.
3 S.O. 1970, c. 97, s. 2, proclaimed in force April 17, 1972.
4
The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, s. 17(1) (a) provides that only those
statutory appeals previously directed to the Supreme Court are to be brought before the
Divisional Court. Those directed to the County Court continue before that court.
r Report, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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excessive workload for each member of the Court or a greatly expanded
appellate bench, the Attorney General appointed a special Committee on the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ontario. 6 On March 10, 1977
this Committee submitted its report. Several modifications to the organization
and structure of Ontario courts and to the appellate process were recommended. Although many of these deserve comment (especially from those
learned in Civil Procedure), this review will focus only on those fundamental
proposals relating to a bifurcation of the Ontario Court of Appeal
and the
7
ancillary adjustments that such a restructuring would necessitate.
I.

PRINCIPAL DELIBERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE COMMITTEE
Because the Hobson's choice of intolerable workload for individual justices or a large, amorphous, disparate appellate bench does not uniquely face
Ontario, the Committee undertook an extensive review of solutions considered
in other common law jurisdictions 8 and examined several palliatives that
have been implemented or proposed elsewhere.
First, the Committee considered whether withdrawing the right to appeal
from certain classes of cases would lead to a reduction in the number of
appeals; for example, by using a monetary criterion (where the amount in
dispute is less than a given amount) or a standard related to subject matter
(where the litigation bears on an automobile accident) or territory (where
the case originates from a judicial district or from a county of less than a
6 The title of this comment, "SPEEDY JUSTICE for the litigant; SOUND JURISPRUDENCE for the province" is the subtitle to the Report, supra note 2.
The Committee was appointed in the fall of 1975 in response to a memorandum
sent to the Attorney General by the Court of Appeal. The terms of reference for the
Committee were "to examine the present, and explore the future needs in Ontario with
respect to the present appellate jurisdiction and function of the Supreme Court of
Ontario and to make recommendations as to methods of meeting and satisfying those
needs: and without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(a) to expound acceptable principles with respect to the right to appeal from judicial
decisions in litigious matters.
(b) to propose lines of demarcation between the objectives and functions of such
appellate courts as are recommended to be continued or established.
(c) to recommend processes for maintaining the adjustment of the capacity of the
appellate courts to the needs of the people of Ontario." (at v.)
Membership was composed of Robert Carter, Q.C., Brendan O'Brien, Q.C., Clay
M. Powell, Q.C., James M. Tory, Q.C., and the chairman, the Hon. Arthur Kelly. In
the course of its deliberations, the Committee consulted all members of the Law Society
of Upper Canada as well as each of the Ontario law faculties.
7 Other recommendations include suggestions respecting the conservation of judicial
time, the procedure to be followed on appeals, the Court of Appeal office, in-court
operation, law clerks, oral or written argument, the provision for direct access to the
Court of Appeal and the preparation and transmission of transcripts. They are summarized at pp. 73-77 of the Report, supra note 2, and represent many good ideas for
improving the appellate process.
8 Members of the Committee travelled to the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, and received information from most U.S. jurisdictions. See Report, supra note
2,at3.
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certain population). The opportunity to appeal, however, if not an inherent
right, is certainly well entrenched in our legal values and, from a psychological standpoint, probably could not easily be removed. 9 Moreover, such a
change would serve neither of the two objectives which the Committee viewed
as part of its mandate: the provision of speedy justice to the litigant and the
development of sound jurisprudence for the province. Errors at first instance
may be committed by all courts, at any level, and important juristic principles
may flow from all types of decisions. An appellate court, therefore, ought not
to be precluded, at the outset, from reviewing any particular class of disputes.
A second proposal examined and rejected by the Committee was a reduction of the time expended in the hearing of each appeal through imposition of time limits on oral argument.10 During the years 1973-75, however,
the average time taken by each cause before the Court of Appeal has been
134 hours." This is only slightly more than the maximum time allotted by
the Supreme Court of the United States (which at this time has the most
restrictive limit on oral argument).12 Consequently, excessively long oral
argument cannot be viewed as a major cause of appellate overcrowding in
Ontario. Further, it is a truism that work expands to fill allotted time, so that
under a regime of mandatory time limits it is possible that many appeals now
terminated very briefly will drag on until the maximum allotted time has
expired. Finally, some cases require more time for thorough argument; where
that is the case, the court ought to be able to continue a hearing as long as
necessary.
Closely allied with the idea of placing time restrictions on oral argument
is the proposal to increase judicial efficiency by permitting the submission of
lengthy written briefs. 13 Yet, as has been demonstrated in the United States,
any time saved by reducing oral presentation would be consumed in the digestion of written material.
A fourth proposal reviewed by the Committee involved increasing the
number and/or duties of judicial clerks. 14 Although clerks perform valuable
9 Report, supra note 2, at 12. See also P. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the
Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the NationalLaw (1969),
82 Harv. L. Rev. 542; and J. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion (1975), 25 Stan. L.
Rev. 567.
10 This solution has found favour among some U.S. commentators. See J. Hopkins,
Small Sparks From a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate Process (1972), 38
Brooklyn L. Rev. 551; and S. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the
Judicial System (1971), 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 901.
11 Report, supra note 2, at 15.
12 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 44(3), 28 U.S.C.A. provides that unless the court orders
otherwise, the maximum time permitted each side for the presentation of oral argument
is thirty minutes. Even in an extremely significant case such as United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, argued July 8, 1974, the Court granted only an additional
thirty minutes to each side, the proceedings lasting from 10:02 a.m. until 1:04 p.m.
See L. Friedman, ed., United States v. Nixon; the President before the Supreme Court
(New York: Chelsea House Pub., 1974) at 523-96.
13 For a related suggestion, see I. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An
Appellate ProceduralReform (1974), 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1094.
14 Cf. A. Tate, Relieving the Appellate Court Crisis (1973), 56 Judicature 228.
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bibliographical, consultative and organizational services, increasing their number of duties is not likely to significantly reduce the time expended by each
judge on a case. The hearing of argument, the formation of a decision, the
justification of an opinion and the drafting of a judgment are the major time
consumers and the most non-delegable of judicial functions. The very use
of the term "judgment" highlights the intuitu personae nature of these tasks.
Better, more thoroughly researched and carefully justified opinions may result
from increased use of clerks, but little time saving is likely to be achieved.
Similarly, certain procedural changes may speed-up the appellate process, may reduce backlogs, and may lead to an earlier crystallization of issues,
but the primary benefit here would be to the litigant and not to the Court. In
no substantial way would these modifications reduce the time required for the
hearing, or the reasoning and drafting of opinions.1 5 The Committee recommends streamlining the appellate process, as it also suggests increasing the
number of clerks, yet it recognizes the minimal impact that these changes
will have on the workload of the Court.
A final solution considered by the Committee was to increase the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court, thereby transforming it into an intermediate
quasi-appellate body. For several reasons which will be discussed in Part IV
of this comment, this proposal was also rejected.
The unsuitability or ineffectiveness of the above measures, either individually or in combination, led the Committee to conclude that only by an
immediate increase in the number of appellate justices and by a continued
enlargement of their number could the problem of overcrowding of the Court
be eliminated.
However, the most obvious mechanism for effecting this expansion (the
simple continued addition of members to the Court) would create equally
serious problems. First, collegiality, consistency, and disciplined creativity
would be impossible in a court of twenty-five to thirty-two justices sitting concurrently in eight or ten different three-man panels. Furthermore, the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada to reduce the number of appeals it hears
annually thrusts upon the highest courts of each province a greater share of
the task of developing the law of that jurisdiction. A small, unified Court is
a prerequisite to effective law development. Finally, the exhaustive consideration of difficult issues ought to demand the participation of more than three
justices. If panels of five or seven were to become the norm for these cases,
almost fifty justices would be required. In view of these drawbacks, the Committee also rejected the simple expedient of enlarging the size of the Court
of Appeal. As an alternative designed specifically to reduce court overcrowding and avoid creating an amorphous appellate court, a bifurcation of the
Court of Appeal is proposed.
The suggested reorganization draws principally on facets of two other
models for restructuring the Court: (1) the creation of a two-tiered Court of
15 Several proposals are outlined in G. Bell, Towards a More Efficient Federal
Appeals System (1971), 54 Judicature 237.
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Appeal, with all causes going first to the lower level; and (2) the establishment of two or more sections of a single court, with an allocation of function
between them based on a subject matter criterion. However, the simple adoption of either one of these models is rejected, the latter for reasons discussed
below, and the former "because the introduction of another level of appeal
universally available involves added delay and expense."' In their stead, the
Committee suggests creating a single Court of Appeal comprised of two distinct sections having concurrent jurisdiction. One section, a General Section,
would sit in panels of three or five (on special occasions) and would be increased in size as the need for more justices arose. Its membership would
be permanent, in that justices from this Court would neither sit on any trial
court nor be members of the other section on a rotating basis. By the year
2001, approximately twenty to twenty-five justices would be assigned to this
Court. The second section, a Juristic Section, would be comprised of eight
members, including the Chief Justice of Ontario, and would never be expanded in size. All appeals to this section would be by leave. The principal
role of the General Section would be to speedily dispose of "ordinary" appeals, while the Juristic Section would devote its time to the resolution of
causes implying some "law-developing" element. Because the sections would
have concurrent jurisdiction, a litigant could either proceed directly to the
Juristic Section from trial (upon obtaining leave) or present his case to this
section after the General Section had already decided the matter (again after
obtaining leave). At first glance, this unique proposal has much to recommend itself; in the final analysis, however, it is doubtful whether the Committee's Report presents either a viable appellate structure for Ontario or
effectively solves the problem of court overcrowding.
II.

THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF THE REPORT

Upon reading the Report, one is struck principally by the very "lawyerlike" (in the traditional sense of the term) perceptions that seem to sustain
its main recommendations. Three are obvious. The reason for the Committee's
creation did not have so much to do with a re-examination of the function of
appellate review of the litigation process in Ontario, as with the rather technical concern that the courts are overloaded. As a result, the Report really does
not explore the former area nor investigate the causes of a greater recourse
to the courts but concentrates on proposing measures designed only to alleviate this bottleneck. Secondly, in suggesting the division of the Court of Appeal, rather than the creation of a two-tiered appellate system, the Report's
prime focus seems to be merely upon keeping the delay and costs of appellate
review to a minimum. Finally, the Committee seems to believe that formal,
structural changes alone will accomplish its perceived objective. Consequently, it declines to examine the role of judges and lawyers in creating the
problem. Very little consideration seems to have been given to how the Bench
and Bar use or abuse the judicial system. More importantly, the Committee
fails to review the social changes in Ontario that may have produced this
increased litigation.
10 Report, supra note 2, at 18. The validity of this opinion is discussed infra, at
12-14.
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Each of these perceptions can be linked to a different aspect of the
Report's final recommendations, each of which is seriously open to question.
A failure to consider the appellate process from the perspective of the nonlawyer may have induced the Committee to propound a distinction, which
it elevates to one of crucial importance, between "ordinary" and "lawdeveloping" cases. A failure to consider the technicalities of their new proposal seems to have misled the Committee into believing that a bifurcation
of the Court of Appeal will reduce the time and expense of appellate review.
A failure to investigate closely the role of judges and lawyers in this process
and to root out some of the underlying reasons for increased litigiousness
appears to permit the Committee to conclude that continued growth in the
use of courts is irrepressible. Each of these conclusions merits a detailed
examination.
The Committee articulates only two functions of appellate review: (1)
the expeditous resolution of the actual dispute before the court; and (2) the
development of a sound jurisprudence for the province. Even though this is
a rather limited inventory of the role of appellate courts, 17 it highlights the
diversity of functions performed by appellate tribunals. Nevertheless, the Report evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of even these two purposes.
By recommending a bifurcation of the Court of Appeal into General and
Juristic Sections, the Committee seems to forget that these two functions
8
cannot be separated.'
Speedy justice for the litigant implies a proper resolution of his case.
Rarely will this occur in an unjustified or poorly justified judicial opinion.
What we mean by justice is intimately connected with notions of appropriate
justification. 19 It follows that this justification must occur in all decisions of
all courts, and that speedy justice implies the continuous, collaborative development and articulation of meaningful standards to guide conduct.2 0
17For a more complete account, see H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Cambridge: tent. ed., 1958);
K. Llewellyn, How Appellate Courts Decide Cases (1945), 16 Penn. Bar Assoc. Q. 220;
and R. Aldisert, The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society (1977), 38 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 437.
18 For much of the discussion that follows, I draw heavily on insights presented in
F. Geny, Mithode d'interprgtation et sources en droit privg positif (2d ed. Paris:
F. Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1954); and K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960). See also P. Weiler, Two Models of
Judicial Decision-Making (1968), 46 Can. B. Rev. 406; and K. Scott, Two Models of
the Civil Process (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 937.
19 See E. Bodenheimer, Treatise on Justice (New York: Philosophical Library,
1967); E. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, An Anthropocentric View of Law (New York:
New York University Press, 1949); and C. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London: Routledge & Paul, 1963). See also G. Gottlieb, The Logic
of Choice; An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality (New York: Macmillan, 1968); R. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Towards a Theory of Legal
Justification (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961); and P. Weiler, Legal
Values and Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 1.
20
See L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law (1958), 3 Natural Law Forum
68; L. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel (1958), 3 Natural Law Forum 83; L.
Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law (1946), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 376; Llewellyn, supra
note 18; and Hart and Sacks, supra note 17.
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Concomitant to this, of course, is that sound jurisprudence must be
grounded in the optimum resolution of concrete disputes. The practice of
submitting hypothetical problems to the Jurisconsults may have served the
Romans well, but the common law demands that each judge focus his attention on the concrete dispute before him. The reports are replete with bad
judgments resulting from overly theoretical judicial speculation. Similarly, unthinking analysis and exegesis from abstract principles without a healthy dose
of the practical, or absent common sense, has resulted in legal anomalies. 21
Contrary to popular opinion, hard cases (when properly argued, properly
reasoned, and properly justified) make good, not bad law. Thus, sound jurisprudence involves the tying up of loose ends in several previous decisions,
the development of new exceptions that alter previous rules, the setting of
signposts for future judgments and the adjudication of conflicting precedents
-all of which require a concrete instance to bring competing interests into
clear perspective.2
Underlying the Committee's view that these two functions of appellate
decision making are separable is an even more basic belief that a meaningful
distinction can be drawn between a "policy", "law-developing" or "juristic"
case and decision on the one hand, and an "ordinary, precedent-bound" or
"general" case on the other. Under this view, the task of providing speedy
justice assigned to the General Section ought to be performed only in respect
of "ordinary" cases, while the task of developing a sound jurisprudence
assigned to the Juristic Section ought to be performed only when a "lawdeveloping" case arises. This dichotomy simply does not exist. 23
Although not all lawyers would subscribe to the view that "every application of general rules to specific cases requires the making of policy choices," 24
21For example, see Mitchell v. The Queen (1975), 61 D.L.R.(3d) 77, [1976] 1
W.W.R. 577, 24 C.C.C.(2d) 241; Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd. et al. v. St. Anne-Nackawic
Pulp & Paper Co. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 580, (1975), 56 D.L.R.(3d) 409; and the
examples cited in S. Wexler, Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of Law (1975),
25 U. of T. L. J. 120. The value of the concrete example has been most effectively illustrated in several articles defending the 'case method' of teaching law. See L. Fuller,
On Teaching Law (1950), 3 Stan. L. Rev. 35; and K. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in
Our Case-Law of Contract (1938), 47 Yale L. J. 1243.
22 Cf. Hart and Sacks, supra note 17; and L. Fuller, The forms and limits of adjudication (unpub., 1959).
23 1 am assuming, of course, that the dispute is one in which an appeal ought
legitimately to be brought, ie., that there is some legal issue that is genuinely in dispute.
If the Committee is suggesting that the General Section should deal with these other
"non-appeals," perhaps the distinction is valid. But if that is the case (which I doubt),
they are consciously making a mockery of appellate review.
24
This theme is developed in M. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A
Policy-OrientedApproach to Legal Study (1956), 1 Natural Law Forum 53. One of the
most abused words in the legal vocabulary is "policy." Often the word is bandied about
in such a way as to suggest that "policy decisions" are capricious or arbitrary. In this
context, "policy" is used simply to reflect the fact that any legal decision is a product
of "non-legal" (in the purely positivistic sense) factors. In The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals, supra note 18, Llewellyn uses the terms "Grand Style" and "Formal
Style" to distinguish modes of decision-making, the former now usually labelled as
policy decision-making. My point here is that the decision to adopt the Formal Style or
the Grand Style is itself a "policy" decision.
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judicial decision-making is currently viewed not as a mechanical exercise but
as a creative endeavour which compels judges to consider both the internal
logic as well as the external purpose of legal rules. Some cases will always
appear simple; yet the process of judicial reasoning and the factors that
produce good appellate judgments remain constant, regardless of whether a
case, at first glance, seems simple or complex. For example, if a court chooses
to dispense with an appeal summarily, i.e., without undertaking an investigation of the merits of a given legal rule to determine if the case at hand ought
to be distinguished, this does not occur because such a case is inherently uncomplicated. Rather, it is because the court chooses, i.e., makes a "policy"
decision, not to attach weight to inputs such as social context, history, equity,
custom, morality, expendiency, etc. On the other hand, if judges do consider
these other criteria in deciding whether to extend a given rule or to distinguish the present case from such a rule, the relative importance they accord
to each factor involves additional considerations of legal "policy." It is often
impossible to know in advance which collection of factors a court will select
in reaching a decision, to know whether its style will be one of legalism, or
whether its style will be one of judicial creativity, to know whether it will
"develop" the law by extending a rule, or "develop" the law by restricting the
scope of that rule. In the best of circumstances, the analysis of whether or not
a decision is one of "policy" or "law-development" is an exercise in postdiction which depends on one's political prejudices and the side of the case
one argued. It is therefore meaningless to attempt to predict which cases
involve enough "policy" so as to generate "law-developing" decisions in
order to establish separate jurisdictions for two appellate courts.
Even if the definition of "policy" were narrowed to mean simply "a
justification which overtly involves elements constituting a departure from
strict legalism," any attempt to enjoin the General Section from engaging in
such activity would be doomed; the nature of the appellate function and the
institutional pressures weighing on all appellate justices would soon subvert
this injunction.
In the first place, very few cases in relation to the total number of disputes in our society are ever taken to court, let alone appealed. 25 Therefore,
as a general practice, counsel must be convinced that strong legal arguments support their position before the decision to litigate is made. 20 Such a
situation should occur only when the facts or the applicable law are unclear.
Since, in theory, appellate argument is generally restricted to questions of
law, even a pro forma appellate judgment will almost never be a strictly logical piece of deductive reasoning from precise black-letter rules. 27 An appellate
25 Cf. Hart and Sacks, "The Great Pyramid of the Legal Order," in The Legal
Process, supra note 17, at 312; and J. Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth
(1948), 13 Law and Contemporary Problems 369.
26 See Llewellyn, supra note 18, at 3-19.
27 See E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); and B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1921).
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justice who insists (in the majority of cases he hears) that the law is clear
28
takes the counsel who appear before him, or at least one of them, for a fool.
Further, by refusing to justices in the General Section a power to render
"law-developing" decisions, one does not thereby change the nature of appellate work. Rather, one simply drives the true bases for decision underground.
Cardozo's great skill lay not so much in reworking the law as in adjusting
and reconceptualizing facts.2 9 By fostering excessive "fact-development" at
the appellate level, however, both speedy justice and sound jurisprudence are
compromised.
Thirdly, on a more pragmatic level, what remedies would be available
to a party in a proceeding before the General Section in the event this court
rendered a "law-developing" judgment? A simple right of appeal would render the proposed division meaningless. 2 0 Moreover, there is a strong possibility that conflicting lines of jurisprudence will develop: one which purports to
be legalistic and one which purports to be idealistic. Although some minor
difficulties might arise if functionally the results of the conflicting approaches
are coincident; if they should diverge, chaos would result.
A final problem with the proposed division of jurisdiction relates more
to the use to which the practicing lawyer puts appellate decisions. When a
client walks into an office seeking legal advice, an advocate will attempt to
extract and arrange the facts related to him into a form with which he is
familiar. An automobile accident is soon reconceptualized as "negligence,
causation, damage"; a revocation of a liquor licence becomes "affects rights,
super-added duty to act judicially." In general, a lawyer will draw on three
principal sources during this process of reconceptualization: his legal education, his digests, citators and textbooks, and his case reports. For the experienced appellate practitioner, the most effective of these guides are, of course,
judicial decisions. Consequently, the form and content of every appellate
opinion is of great significance, and he carefully reads all judgments, not just
those in his particular field or relating to his present litigation.8 1
Moreover, not only is it important to read all appellate opinions in order
to appreciate the flavour of a given court's reasoning, but also because great
policy often derives from little increments. Little increments often flow from
hints dropped in the resolution of a constant barrage of similar minor inequities. Appellate law-making is not always grandiose, but most frequently
occurs in the interstices of legal rules.m The wise practitioner gauges not only
2

8 Cf. B. Cardozo, The Paradoxesof Legal Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928).
29 See J. Frank, What the Courts do in Fact (1932), 26 ll. L. Rev. 645; J. Frank,
Courts on Trial; Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1949); and C. Clark and D. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint
and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition (1961), 71 Yale L. . 255.
80 The Committee, nevertheless, does recommend a procedure whereby such decisions may, with leave, be appealed. Report, supra note 2, at 21.
31 This point has been most forcefully made by Llewellyn, supra note 18, at 236-55.
32 The most thorough exposition of this process can be found in Geny, supra note
18; and C. Allen, Law in the Making (7th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) at
236-366.
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the results of ground-breaking decisions, but the rhetoric of even the most
mundane cases. Almost every appeal, therefore, is important for the manner
in which its outcome is justified. To restrict elaborate judicial reasoning and
justification to a small number of "policy" cases would make the conscientious lawyer's now difficult task almost impossible.
Thus, because the universe of appeals cannot be divided, either in theory
or practice, into "law-developing" and "ordinary" compartments, any restructuring of the appellate process predicated on such a distinction would
be unfortunate. The basic recommendation of the Report as to the jurisdiction of the two Sections, consequently, ought not to be adopted.
A second concern which seems to pervade the Committee's thinking is
tied to the delay and cost of litigation to the parties. In fact, the rejection of
a two-tiered appellate hierarchy is premised principally on the basis that it
will increase the cost of dispute resolution and will unnecessarily delay the
final determination of legal issues. However, such a structure does not seem
to have unduly dissuaded our litigious neighbours to the south, where the cost
choice has become not "can I afford one appeal or two" but rather "do I take
any appeals at all."
Moreover, the Report surprisingly considers neither other measures that
might serve to reduce appellate costs nor whether their proposed structure
will in fact lead to cheaper and more expeditious judicial review. For example,
one of the most effective means of controlling the expense of litigation is
through awards of costs. Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has imposed upon the appellant in selected cases the burden of paying costs as a
condition of leave being granted.3 3 Again, where only the amount of a judgment is in dispute, the Court could be given the power to award, on an interim
basis, a portion of the judgment at trial. Such a power could also be granted
in cases where the appeal is only for contribution. "Tactical appeals" by
economically stronger parties can thus be discouraged.
Further, little thought seems to have been devoted to reducing appellate
costs through technological innovation in the area of transcripts, appeal books,
etc. In addition, no suggestion as to limiting counsel fees (or even compelling
lawyers to assume their own costs if the court adjudges the appeal frivolous84 )
was offered. Nor did the Committee consider attempting to structure a second
level of the Court of Appeal as an alternative court of final resort, to be
appealed to only in the event that leave from the Supreme Court of Canada
was refused. Each of these mechanisms could serve to reduce the cost of
appellate review.
The Committee also believes that its proposals will prove more expeditious than a two-tiered appellate structure, yet it is not clear that that would
be the case. The Report recommends that all appeals to the Juristic Section
be by leave. Unless a novel approach to leave granting is adopted, it is unWFor example, see Madill v. Chu, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 400.
The topic of liability for costs is quite interesting; the elaboration of a workable
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likely that substantial time savings will be achieved by substituting for a twotiered system a structure whereby leave must always be obtained. In addition,
the Report envisions the possibility of appeals (with leave) from the General
Section to the Juristic Section. In these cases, an increased delay as well as a
greater expenditure of judicial time would occur. Finally, the possibility that
decisions of the Juristic Section could be appealed to the Supreme Court,
again by leave only, would mean that in several cases, at least five, and
sometimes six separate appellate rehearings would take place.35
Consequently, although the narrow issue of time and cost saving impelled the Committee to recommend a bifurcation of the Court of Appeal
rather than the creation of another appellate court, this restructuring, in fact,
does not promise a cheaper or more expeditious appellate procedure. Given
the confusion normally created by the introduction of novel structures or
procedures, and in the absence of substantial benefits to be derived therefrom,
this second proposal of the Committee also ought not to be adopted.
A third perception that underlies much of the work of the Committee
appears to be that increased use of courts to solve disputes is inevitable and
that, consequently, the Report need only recommend a structural change
which will solve the current appellate malaise in Ontario. Although structures
can often be designed to facilitate, or conversely, to impede effective litigation,
they alone are not key determinants.3" Rather, it is upon two venerable institutions that the greatest responsibility for effective use of the appellate process
must lie: the Bench and the Bar.
With respect to the Bar, it is obvious that the success of good counsel
derives, in part, from their skill in advocacy. But knowledge of what cases
ought to be appealed, of what types of arguments a particular court is likely
to entertain, and when a court has been convinced are also crucial to their
success. The Committee recognizes this fact in its observation that "economy
in the use of the time of an appellate court requires the court to have the
benefit of argument from capable and prepared counsel. This appears more
likely to be achieved where the counsel appearing on an appeal is one who
has chosen advocacy as a career and has accumulated some experience in
that field.., the unnecessary burden thrown on the appellate courts by the
appearances before them of inexperienced counsel requires that serious consideration be given to establishing some standards to be met by lawyers
seeking to represent their clients in a sophisticated and demanding arena such
as the Court of Appeal. ' '31 Simply put, the best lawyers produce the best
judgments and do so most efficiently.
35 For example: (i)a certiorari before the Juristic Section denied; (ii) a hearing
before the General Section; (iii) a re-application for certiorari before the Juristic Section; (iv) a hearing before the Juristic Section; (v) a certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Canada; (vi) a hearing before the Supreme Court. One consideration the Committee
seems to have ignored is that if the General Section reverses the decision at trial, there
is almost prima facie evidence of a "law-developing" need. Only where the trial judge
patently "erred" in law will this not be the case.
30 Cf. Carrington, supra note 9.
a7 Report, supra note 2, at 41. Cf. I. Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to
Qualified Counsel? (1975), 61 A.B.AJ. 569.
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There are also several other ways in which the Bar can contribute to
improving the appellate process. First, it must be admitted that in several
cases clients put substantial pressure on their lawyers to take appeals even
when the latter recommend against such a procedure. Perhaps a system which
permits advocates to discourage the prosecution of dilatory appeals, or tactical appeals by economically stronger parties 88 should be instituted. Secondly,
the time is possibly now ripe for a re-examination of the fee-for-service format of remuneration in appellate causes.89 It is unfortunately the case, especially where the Ontario Legal Aid Plan is involved, that some appeals are
instituted for less than appropriate reasons. As long as the prosecution of
certain appeals is lucrative to the advocate, the same abuse which threatens
to bankrupt medicare will affect our appellate process. Finally, the Bar has
an important role to play on a psychological level. The refusal to falsely hold
out to clients the prospect of appellate reversal, avoidance (assuming the
courts are co-operative) of the shot-gun approach to trial court error, and
candour in performance of its educative role, all may serve to reduce the
number of appeals.
However, probably no group bears greater responsibility for the explosion of appellate litigation than the appellate justices themselves. The mere
structural division of the Court of Appeal into two panels is not likely to
produce the desired results absent a continued careful selection of members
of the appellate bench. More importantly, there must be a conscientious
effort by the judiciary to avoid encouraging appeals through excessive sentence tinkering, damages adjustments or incomprehensible judgment justifications; 40 furthermore, judgments must be rendered in a manner designed to
facilitate future out-of-court settlements. Thus, the judiciary is seized with
two devices for reducing its workload (neither of which seem to have found
much favour in Ontario). First, although reversals on appeal ought to be
restricted to cases where errors in principle occur at trial, our courts seem to
be preoccupied with review to such a degree that their inventiveness in creating errors in principle parallels the efforts of the British House of Lords to
manufacture reviewable "jurisdictional errors" in administrative law. 41 Secondly, appeal judgments must be written in such a way as to encourage private
ordering. A plethora of decisions dismissing actions on procedural grounds
and avoiding the merits encourages rather than discourages litigation. Similarly, a desire to assert a supervisory jurisdiction over consensual and other
non-judicial tribunals induces resort to the courts. Commercial umpires, labour arbitrators and membership boards of private clubs all can attest to this
presumed judicial omniscience. Finally, a genuine concern by the judiciary
to structure judgments so as to foreclose experimental litigation through the
38

Barton, supra note 9.
39 Aldisert, supra note 17, at 456-63.
40 See text, infra, at 20-22. Cf. J. Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A
Method of Swift Appellate Action (1976), 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 491 and bibliography
therein.
41 Cf. Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at
171 (per Lord Reid), [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163, [1969] 1 All E.R. 208.
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comprehensive review of alternative conceptualizations of the same issue will
reduce unnecessary appeals. 42
Once again, the Committee's assessment of the ills of the appellate process led it to assume that a solution lay in a simple structural reorganization
of the Court of Appeal, as opposed to a re-evaluation of the institutional role
played by its two principal actors, the Bench and Bar. As a result, in each of
its three underlying premises, the Report seems to gloss over the real problems, or fails to advance solutions based on tenable distinctions.
III. ASPECTS OF THE APPELLATE PROCESS NOT CONSIDERED
BY THE COMMTTEE
Although the Report purports to consider all aspects of the appellate
process in Ontario, several major points are either not discussed or resolved
in a questionable fashion. For example, the Committee does not address the
issue of stare decisis; nor is the question of what criteria can be used to
differentiate appeals raised. The Report simply suggests that, in time, lawyers
will learn when resort ought to be had to the Juristic Section. The problem
of how access to the Juristic Section is to be controlled is casually dismissed.
Finally, the Report seems to suggest that the Juristic Section ought to be
permitted to sit in panels, rather than en banc. These issues are important no
matter what structure is adopted (that proposed by the Committee, or a twotiered system), and they ought to have been fully canvassed.
Changes in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada as well as the
outcome of certain recent cases before that court make it imperative that all
43
provincial appellate courts reconsider their position regarding stare decisis.
Because the Supreme Court may now control its caseload, fewer disputes
from Ontario will be decided ultimately in that forum and a greater responsibility for articulating judicial policy will be thrust upon provincial appeal
courts. In addition, although the question is still very much open, recent
Supreme Court decisions4 4 indicate the desire of at least some members
of the court to follow the lead of the House of Lords and recognize a power
to overrule previous decisions.
42For a philosophical approach to this issue, see F. Northrop, The Complexity of
Legal and Ethical Experience; Studies in the Method of Normative Subjects (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1959).
43 See An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act and to make related amendments
to the Federal Court Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 18, s. 10. The Supreme Court appears
jealous of this new power and has already indicated to the Ontario Court of Appeal
that it will itself decide which issues to address. See Giffels Associates Ltd. v. Eastern
Construction Co. (unreported, S.C.C., released February 7, 1978) at 2-3, where Chief
Justice Laskin noted: "It is for this Court alone to determine whether it will give leave
to argue here a point not taken or argued or considered by the Court appealed from.
If the Ontario Court of Appeal was not prepared to rehear the appellant, there was no
reason for allowing an amendment to the notice of appeal after judgment was delivered,
and less reason to add the point of the amendment to the questions to be argued in

this Court."

44 See especially Harrisonv. Carswell (1975), 62 D.L.R.(3d) 68, [1975] 6 W.W.R.

673 (S.C.C.).
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It has often been suggested that the process of restrictive distinction is
a satisfactory palliative to the rigors of strict adherence to precedent. 45 Many
arguments can be advanced against this view, however. First, on appeal, it is
often the reasons for judgment that are much more crucial than the actual
disposition of the case. When courts are denied the power to articulate clearly
the underlying reasons justifying a judgment (which occurs whenever the
"operative facts" theory of ratio decidendi, which, in turn, is a product of a
strict view of precedent, is adopted), their jurisprudence often degenerates
into a meaningless collection of single instances. 4 6
Secondly, the doctrine of restrictive distinction places an inordinate emphasis on the order in which cases are heard. In England, the rule of R. v.
Electricity Commissioners47 respecting certiorari survived until Ridge v.
Baldwin,48 partly because no sufficiently distinguishable case was litigated.
Many courts, such as the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne,40 followed this rule even to absurd lengths. Even though the House of Lords
effectively overruled R. v. Electricity Commissioners, Canadian courts still
slavishly follow the old rule because the Supreme Court of Canada first
addressed the issue prior to the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin. ° The result is
that Canadian courts adhere to a rule based on English precedent that is no
longer law in England. 1 This purely fortuitous order of litigation has committed Canadian courts to a position which is probably the opposite to that
which they would have reached had their first opportunity to decide the issue
arisen seven years later. An ability to depart from prior decisions permits a
court to reduce the capriciousness of the doctrinal bridges that expand or
contract the scope of a prior decision.m
A third defect of restrictive distinguishing is its tendency to encourage
rather than reduce litigation. If a rule has potentially a dozen areas into
45 Cf. P. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence(12th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1966) at 148; R. Dias, Jurisprudence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1976) at 176-204;
Allen, supra note 32, at 360-66; and G. Gall, The Canadian Legal System (Toronto:
Carswell, 1977) at 187-95.
46 Some of the most unsatisfactory areas of the law reflect this problem. For example, Robert Reid devotes more than 100 pages in his administrative law text to collecting cases on "when a hearing is required," yet concludes that no satisfactory test has
been advanced by the courts. R. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1971) at 1-52, 111-58. An excellent analysis of how ad hoc decisionmaking can impede the development of law is found in Paul Weiler's trenchant criticism
of the Supreme Court of Canada. P. Weller, The Supreme Court and the Law of
CanadianFederalism (1973), 23 U. of T. L. J. 306.
47 [1924] 1 K.B. 171.
48 [1964] A.C. 40, [1963]2 W.L.R. 716, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 (H.L.).

49
50

(1951] A.C. 66.

See Calgary Power Ltd. and Halmrast v. Copithorne, [1959] S.C.R. 24, (1958),
16 D.L.R.(2d) 241.
51
See Howarthv. NationalParoleBoard,[1976] 1 S.C.R. 453, (1974), 50 D.L.R. (3d)
349, 18 C.C.C.(2d) 385.
52The idea of a doctrinal bridge was first advanced by Lon Fuller in 1934. See
L. Fuller, American Legal Realism (1934), 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429 at 438-42.
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which it may be extended, the process of restrictive distinguishing requires
twelve cases to establish that the former rule is really an exception in a
thirteenth case. Under a system where overruling is permitted, only one instance is required, and the unfortunate exception may be laid to rest at an
earlier date. 53
Finally, it is anomolous that an appellate court, which the Committee
itself acknowledges must perform a "law-developing" role, be restricted to
developing law only once. Surely the factors which make it necessary for a
court to overtly recognize its creative role do not occur (with respect to the
same fact situation) once and for all the first time the court addresses the
problem. Experience, insight and pragmatics (as well as other factors which
influence judicial policy) will always be present. Yet the face they show at
any given time will be continually in flux. Such considerations cannot be
dispensed with forever on the basis of one discrete, individual instance. Given
these factors, the Committee ought to have considered whether or not the
judicial custom of stare decisis should be allowed to develop in the new
court.
It has been suggested that the distinction between policy or lawdeveloping and non-policy or ordinary decisions cannot be sustained. Because
the Report elevates this non-distinction to a position of crucial importance, it
ignores all other factors that may serve to guide a court in deciding whether
or not a case merits review by a higher level appellate tribunal. Nevertheless,
there are reasonably identifiable criteria already present within our legal
tradition that may be useful to any appellate court which must decide which
judicial "policy" to select in any given instance. Since a new appeal structure
is being recommended, these considerations, which may be grouped under the
rubric "fidelity to law", might be considered as a foundation for any future
proposals respecting access to Ontario's ultimate appellate tribunal.5 4
A court confronted with any appeal must always be concerned with the
functional effect of its decision upon the judicial system as a whole. It matters
little if a judge says that he will only revise sentences where an error in principle is involved if in four or five given cases he overrules the trial court. Not
only does this action open the door to increasing numbers of appeals but it
may also generate feelings of inferiority, mistrust or hostility among trial
judges. The simplest (although not the best) way to reduce the volume of
appeals is to invariably sustain lower courts. Sometimes an appellate court
ought to deny an otherwise meritorious appeal for the reason that the difference between a damages award of $1,000,000 and $800,000 is not significant
when compared to the institutional consequences which such tinkering pro3 For one illustration of this process and a critique of its effects, see J. Baudouin,
Les Obligations (Montreal: Presses de l'Universit6 de Montr6al, 1970) at 62-63.
54 The best enumeration and explanation of these features may be found in
Llewellyn, supra note 18, at 62-232. This book should be mandatory reading for all
those concerned with the work of appellate courts. Paradoxically, the Committee, in
another context (Chapter 14: Procedure for Direct Access to Court of Appeal), sets
about trying to isolate some of these factors. Report, supra note 2, at 53-54.
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duces.5 5 Similarly, the prime motivation for the refusal of an appellate court
to qualify, distinguish or overrule an established lower court rule may be a
concern that settled expectations will be unduly compromised.
The notion of fidelity to law means, secondly, that an appellate court
should be concerned not only with justifying its decision on the basis of
accepted legal doctrine, but also indicating clearly and succinctly how it
expects trial courts to approach such cases in the future. That is, appellate
courts ought not to "develop" the law unless they are in a position to provide
meaningful guidance to lower courts as to what is to be attended in the future.
Some appeals do not lend themselves to such elaboration. If "law-making" is
essentially the creation of a new legal rule, as opposed to the articulation of
a general principle, the social and economic costs of such a move may be too
great unless the court is able to justify its decision in terms that will impede
further litigation and facilitate out-of-court settlements." In an era where
the positivistic urge in jurisprudence is on the wane, it is distressing that the
recommendations of this report hark back to a view of law as fiat which
imposes itself on an inert society, and whose efficacy is believed to be independent of its utility.
A third factor to be considered by an appellate court proposing to alter
the law involves a determination of the "political" consciousness of the parties
to any dispute. The more cohesive each side appears, the greater the chances
that a more appropriate remedy will lie in the political arena. Chief Justice
Deschenes recently undertook an analysis of this nature in a Quebec Labour
case.57 Politically organized groups should usually not be permitted to make
a court into the final arbiter of the political process. On the other hand, areas
such as family and contract law, for example, often provide the court with
an opportunity to create meaningful guidelines for the development of human
interaction in a rapidly changing world. 8
Clearly, the above list is only a beginning in answering the problem of
55 A recent example of appellate tinkering may be found in Teno v. Arnold (1976),
11 O.R.(2d) 585, 67 D.L.R.(3d) 9, where the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced a
damages award by Keith J., (1974), 7 O.R.(2d) 276, 55 D.L.R.(3d) 57, from $950,000
to $875,000. The case is presently before the Supreme Court of Canada. Similar considerations arise when a court must decide whether or not to intervene in an appeal
from the decision of an administrative tribunal. Cf. Rowntree Co. v. Paulin Chambers
Co., [1968] S.C.R. 134 at 138.
56 For example, the difficulties in determining whether or not the Trial Division
of the Federal Court has jurisdiction under s. 18 or the Federal Court of Appeal has
jurisdiction under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1, are only partly
the responsibility of the legislative draftsman. The almost total lack of comprehensible
justification offered by these panels has greatly contributed to this problem. See J. Evans,
The Trial Division of the Federal Court: An Addendum (1977), 23 McGill L. J. 132
at 143. For a discussion of one method of minimizing the effects of such creativity, see
M. Friedland, Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Law Making (1974), 24 U. of T.
L. J. 170.
57
Commission de Transport de la Communautj Urbaine de Montr6al v. Syndicat
du Transport de Montrial, [1974] C.S. 227.
58 Cf. C. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts (1957), 41 Minn.
L. Rev. 751 for a different perspective.
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which factors ought to compel a court to undertake a revision of existing
legal rules. But it is important to emphasize that such criteria lead to a more
consistent development of legal doctrines than a purported distinction between
"policy" and "non-policy" appeals. The relevant factors which ought to influence a court in deciding whether to entertain a further appeal, therefore,
must be attached to the "process of discovery"' 9 and not to the reasons a
court might offer in the justification of its decisions.
Assuming that considerations which affect judicial "policy", such as
those just outlined, can be crystallized into meaningful criteria, there still
remain significant problems in deciding when and by whom these criteria
ought to be applied. At least four mechanisms for restricting access to higher
courts may be suggested: a statutory framework, the use of an attorneygeneral's certificate, the imposition of a pre-appeal certiorariprocedure, or
the abdication of this decision to litigants and their counsel. Without considering the merits of each of these alternatives, the committee simply recommends a combination of the third and fourth procedures. 60 Arguments can
also be advanced for each of the others, however, and perhaps some combination thereof ought to have been considered.
A first method would be to set out in the statute organizing an appellate
structure certain criteria that would invariably be applied in distinguishing
which cases deserve a third hearing. Yet, if such a procedure were adopted,
it would have to be carefully thought out, for the traditional means of categorizing appeal rights are not based on such criteria. Surely the overall importance of legal issues is rarely tied either to the amount of money in dispute
or the subject matter of the dispute. Appeals of interlocutory decisions, or
from sentence in criminal matters, or quantum in damages actions, or interpretation of contracts or wills are not always simple cases. Furthermore, the
difficulties that have arisen in the interpretation of sections 18 and 28 of
the Federal Court Act attest to the problems involved in attempting to draft
in advance the characteristics which will distinguish "important" from "run
of the mill" cases. 61 Nevertheless, it is possible to enumerate criteria such as
"whenever there is a dissent at the first appellate level" or "whenever the
Appeal Courts of two or more provinces are in disagreement." This would
obviate the necessity of a certiorarihearing for all tertiary appeals.
A second approach to the problem of setting the criteria governing judicial policy would be to permit an attorney general's committee to certify
appeals. In the field of criminal law, however, such a proposal raises the issue
of nemo iudex in causa sua. Even if the Attorney General's appeal certification committee is independent of the Crown Attorney's office, the appearance
of bias would remain. Further, the jurisdiction of the provincial government
to define the limits of criminal appeals is doubtful.6 In civil cases, this pro59 See Wasserstrom, supra note 19.
6
oReport, supra note 2, at 19.
01 See D. Mullan, The Federal Court Act: A Misguided Attempt at Administrative
Law Reform? (1973), 23 U. of T. L. J. 14 at 28-31.
62 See Report, supra note 2, at 28-31, 85 (Appendix D) where this issue is addressed by the Committee.
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cedure would take control of the prosecution of a lawsuit away from the
parties. It, therefore, ought not be adopted in the absence of a thorough examination of the underlying reasons for an adversarial system of adjudication. Yet there may be much merit in allowing a party who otherwise has
insufficient means to apply to the Attorney General for funding in certain
cases where he would be ineligible for legal aid or would receive only a
partial certificate.
The suggestion that elaboration of the criteria that would affect judicial
activity should be left entirely in the hands of the court itself is, at first sight,
appealing. However, two facets of such an approach militate against making
this mechanism the sole determinant of tertiary appeals. First, the experience
of many U.S. jurisdictions (including the U.S. Supreme Court) indicates that
often the most important criterion in determining whether an appeal merits
consideration is the existing caseload or backlog on the docket. 8 Second,
certiorariapplications often take as much time on argument as full appeals.
If the requirement of a prior certiorarihearing results in only a 50 percent reduction in the number of cases heard, this approach can hardly be justified. On
the other hand, allowing the court to indicate (either in its judgments, or by
policy papers released in a manner similar to those of labour boards) the
kinds of cases which it is predisposed to hear may sufficiently satisfy the
judge's desire to exercise at least some control over their workload.0 4
A fourth approach to the problem of defining the characteristics of a
case that would call for judicial reconsideration of existing doctrine would
be to leave the decision in the hands of those who were originally parties to
an action. This traditional adversarial solution may not be appropriate, however, where the function of the court is conceived primarily as one of "lawdeveloping." Under that system, the determination of when a decision calls
for extensive analysis would be contingent, in many cases, upon a variety of
non-legal considerations. First, the better the lawyer one could afford to hire,
the greater the chances of his developing the case into one of momentous
"policy." Moreover, the cost of an appeal, the possibility of passing up an
attractive settlement offer and the possibility of losing might pressure some
litigants into not appealing to a higher court. Third, where partial success has
already been achieved, the fear of being "out-gunned" on appeal may discourage such actions, for not all litigants can afford to research and prepare
extensive briefs. If an appellate court is to develop and articulate its own
distinctive jurisprudence, the cases which come before it ought not to be
determined predominantly by these non-legal considerations.
The above observations are intended only to indicate the significance
that attaches to the question of who controls appeals when an express
purpose of such appeals is to develop law for the future in addition to adjudicating disputes of the past, and to suggest the inadequate consideration the
Committee appears to have given this question.
68 Carrington, supranote 9.
64
See Bell, supra note 15, for a discussion of some of these alternatives.
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A final aspect of the appellate process to which the Committee does not
appear to have devoted much study relates to the issue of whether a "lawdeveloping" court ought to sit en banc.6 5 In Canada, this practice does not
seem to have developed in the past, although the Supreme Court of Canada
is now adopting the procedure.0 6 Three compelling reasons why a lawdeveloping court ought to adhere to such a practice may be advanced.
First, the more input into decision-making, the better the result likely
to be achieved. Collective maturation of thought among nine judges will produce better, more balanced opinions than those of a five-man panel. 67 In
addition, only by allowing full input on every decision will diverging trends
caused by differently constructed panels be avoided. One of the principal
difficulties that results from an amorphous bench is the possibility of counsel "jockeying" for panels, much as some lawyers now "jockey" for certain
trial judges. Furthermore, the opinions of a Court sitting en banc carry more
psychological weight, both for lower courts and for the Bar. A continuing
problem in the Supreme Court of Canada with civil law appeals from Quebec
derives specifically from the fact that in order to maintain a majority of
civilian-trained justices on the bench the Court must sit as a five-man panel,
the same number of justices who sit in the Quebec Court of Appeal, where all
are civilian educated.68 If the opinions of this new court are to carry significant institutional weight, the bench must be larger than on first appeal.
Consequently, a seven-man Court, whose members always sit en banc, would
probably be the optimum structure for any "law-developing" court in
Ontario. 9
IV. SUBSIDIARY AND TRANSITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the bifurcation of the Court of Appeal is the principal recommendation of the Committee, several other suggestions both for improving
the appellate process in Ontario and for facilitating the transition to this
scheme are offered. Four of these deserve comment.
66 Given that the Committee recommends that the Juristic Section be comprised of
eight members, it would seem that en banc sittings are not contemplated.
6
3 The "Notes of Recent Judgments in the Supreme Court of Canada," numbers 28,
29 and 30, published by the Canadian Law Information Council, indicate that of its
latest 21 judgments, 14 were heard by a Bench of eight or nine and only three by a
Bench of five. Four other cases from Quebec were heard by a Bench of five following
the established practice of ensuring that the three civilian-trained justices form a majority.
67For conflicting opinions in this regard, see H. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term; Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices (1959), 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 at 100;
and T. Arnold, Professor Harts Theology (1960), 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298. See also
W. Murphy, "Marshalling the Court: The Tactic of Judicial Bargaining," in J. Fiszman,
ed., The American PoliticalArena; Selected Readings (2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown,
1966) at 243-60.
68For a recent criticism of the work of the Supreme Court, see J. Baudouin,
L'interpretation du Code Civil Quebecois par la Cour Supreme du Canada (1975), 53
Can. B. Rev. 715 at 715-16 and nn. 1-4.
69 A dissenting view is expressed by L. Blom-Cooper and G. Drewry, The Use of
Full Courts in the Appellate Process (1971), 34 Mod. L. Rev. 364.
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First, with respect to venue, the Report recommends that panels of the
General Section be empowered to sit in all County towns as the need may
arise. While it may not be necessary to immediately extend the venue of the
court this broadly, it is certainly appropriate that an appellate court not be
dominated, for financial or geographic reasons, by the concerns of only one
part of the province.
However, the Committee also recommends that, since the primary function of the Juristic Section is to develop jurisprudence for the province, it sit
only at Osgoode Hall. The only reason advanced for this suggestion is that
such a restriction would permit "counsel appearing before it . . .immediate
access at the time of the hearing of the appeal to the facilities of the Great
Library," for "it would be unreasonable to expect counsel or the Court to
sacrifice the physical presence of such essential material by holding sittings
outside Toronto."7 10 The latest available statistics on the holdings of Ontario
law libraries indicate that the Faculty of Law at York University possesses
174,000 volumes; at the University of Ottawa, 95,000; at Queen's University,
120,000; at the University of Western Ontario, 95,000; at the University of
Windsor, 90,000; and at the University of Toronto, 82,000. The collection
at the Great Library totals 130,000 volumes. 71 It is doubtful that the holdings
of the Great Library are so superior as to warrant on this ground alone the
Court sitting exclusively in Toronto.
It might be suggested, on the other hand, that the reason for holding
sittings only in Toronto is to avoid undue delay in the hearings of appeals.
Such an argument would be irrelevant if the court were to hold sittings in
Ottawa and London one week per month and in Toronto the remainder of
the time. In order to prevent lawyers from Ottawa or London launching
appeals in Toronto, the province could be divided geographically so that all
appeals from southwestern Ontario be heard in London, from eastern and
northeastern Ontario in Ottawa, and from central and northwestern Ontario
in Toronto. Such a system has worked well in Quebec for many years, 72 and
the benefits of having the Court spend one-half its time outside Toronto
would be substantial.
A second subsidiary recommendation of the Committee relates to the
fate of the Divisional Court. Although not entirely clear in the Report, it
appears to be proposed that this Court be abolished. On page two, the Report
70 Report, supra note 2, at 43.
71
These figures are taken from the Directory of Law Libraries published in June
1976 by the American Association of Law Libraries.
72 Article 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The Court of Appeal is
the general appellate tribunal for the province; it hears appeals from any judgment from
which an appeal lies, failing an express provision to the contrary." Article 30 of the
same code specifies: "Appeals from Judgments rendered in the districts of Beauharnois,
Bedford, Hull, Iberville, Joliette, Labelle, Montreal, Pontiac, Richelieu, St. Francis, St.
Hyacinthe, Temiscamingue, and Terrebonne are brought before the Court of Appeal
sitting at Montreal; those from judgments rendered in the other districts, before the
court sitting at Quebec." For an explanation of this structure, see K. Beausoleil, D.
Ferland, H. Reid, Droit JudiciairePrivi:Notes de Cours (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universit6 Laval, 1971) at 36-43.
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speaks only of "appeals from the decision of courts or judges of first instance", while on page 21, the Committee speaks of the "appellate jurisdiction of the Divisional Court" as contrasted with its jurisdiction under The
Judicial Review ProcedureAct. 73 This latter comment would suggest that the
Committee proposes to eliminate the Divisional Court as an appellate body
under sub-section 17(1) (a) as well as under sub-sections 17(1) (c),(d),(e)
and (f) of the JudicatureAct.74 That this is the Committee's view may ultimately be deduced from its incidental recommendation that because the
judicial review papers of this court so resemble the former jurisdiction of the
old Court of Queen's Bench to grant certiorari,prohibition and mandamus,
that this latter power be reinvested in the High Court.
Although it is probably wise to remove much appellate jurisdiction from
the Divisional Court, i.e., from judgments in excess of $200 in the Small
Claims Court, from certain interlocutory orders of the County Court and
Surrogate Court, from all orders of Supreme Court Masters, or the Provincial
Court, Family Division, and to clarify the difficulty involving appeals from
County Court trial de novo or Supreme Court "stated case decisions," there
are several good reasons why the 17(1)(a) jurisdiction of the Divisional
Court should not be abolished and its judicial review jurisdiction retained.
Most of these have been well argued elsewhere and need not be repeated. 75
It is true, as the Committee notes, that the Divisional Court "has failed
to achieve recognition as an effective appellate court,", 76 but this has been
due largely to its rotating membership. Certainly, the experience of the Second
Divisional Court of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Ontario
would confirm this.77 Permanence of tenure as Justices of Appeal is a necessity for the members of any appellate court. When its personnel are rotated
on a quarterly basis, it is understandably difficult for the Divisional Court
to perform a satisfactory appellate function.
Many of the difficulties inherent in the current framework of the Divisional Court could be overcome if a procedure for administrative law matters,
much like that suggested for the handling of criminal appeals, were to be
proposed. The Report rejects the concept of a separate Court of Criminal
Appeals 78 and proposes that, by administrative measures, the Chief Justice
channel criminal appeals to separate panels of the General Section. Although
membership in the panels would rotate, each justice would sit for a period
long enough to gain expertise in the area. An administrative law panel consisting of three judges, each sitting for six terms, might be an appropriate
S.O. 1971, c. 48, s. 6, proclaimed in force April 17, 1972.
This subsection provides: "The Divisional Court has jurisdiction to hear, determine and dispose of (a) all appeals to the Supreme Court under any Act other than
this Act and the County Courts Act."
75 See, in particular, D. Mullan, Reform of Judicial Review of Administrative Action-The Ontario Way (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall LJ. 125 at 125-31, 174-76.
73

74

76 Report, supra note 2, at 19.

77 Id.
78 Id.at 28-31.
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substitute for the Divisional Court, but this panel ought to retain the full
17(1) (a) and (b) jurisdiction now exercised by the Divisional Court.
A third recommendation, incidental to, but flowing from the Committee's main proposal, concerns the issue of written opinions and law reporting.
A recent study by the Canadian Law Information Counci 7 9 has commented
extensively on this issue; yet the Committee restricted its remarks to certain
general observations. In view of the Reporter's substantive recommendations,
however, certain comments are necessary. First, all opinions of the Juristic
Section should be delivered in writing after consideration, and reported in
full. Secondly, most, if not all, judgments of the General Section should be
reported. The motive for compelling written reasons for judgment, and for
wide reporting of all appellate decision relates to comments made earlier.8 0
Leading cases do not arrive neatly packaged and labelled, ready for the Court
of Appeal simply to decide them. Rather, they are created, both by the
quality of the opinion rendered and, currently, by the luck of haphazard law
reporting.
Perhaps the best justification for written decisions has been given by
Lon Fuller, who notes that, in common law judicial decisions, "the rule applied to the case and the reason or justification for that rule are both stated in
the opinion of the judge and are often intertwined to such a point that it is
difficult to distinguish between them."8 1 Even our statutes recognize that
decision-making will be less arbitrary and the process of justification more
exact when opinions are produced in a permanent form.82
With respect to law reporting, it should be noted that many factors other
than the rank in the judicial hierarchy of the Court which gave judgment,
the facts of the case, and the issues in dispute, contribute to whether a decision becomes important from a juristic point of view. Most importantly, the
quality of the judgment rendered will determine a particular case's fate. For
this reason, one often finds the judgments of intermediate appellate courts
moulding the future of the law and dissents becoming the literary jewels of
our legal tradition.83 A second factor that contributes to the future of any
case relates to the vagaries of law reporting. For example, the noted case of
Hadley v. Baxendale84 comes to us principally through the coincidence that
the judge who decided this case at trial was the editor of the popular practi-

79 See Vivian, Law Reporting in Canada:A Study by the CanadianLaw Information Council (unpub., 1976). Also see Canadian Association of Law Libraries, Proceedings (Halifax: unpub., 1977).
80 See text accompanying notes 20-30, supra.
81
L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968) at 90.
82 The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct, S.O. 1971, c. 47, s. 17 provides: "A tribunal
shall give its final decision and order, if any, in any proceedings in writing and shall
give reasons in writing therefor if requested by a party."
83
See Llewellyn, supra note 18, at 430-45.
84 (1854), 9 Ex. 341, 156 E.R. 145.

An interesting account of the precedental history of this case may be found in
R. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the Law (1975),
4 J.of Legal Studies 249.
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tioner's manual, Smith's Leading Cases. Finally, a case may become a leading
case because some author chooses to cite it, or some casebook writer or law
teacher chooses to incorporate it into his materials, or because some lawyer
who argued it, or judge who decided it, continues to cite it in several succeeding opinions.s 5 As a step in reducing the caprice caused by these factors, all
appellate decisions should be reported.8 6 It is not suggested that complete
reporting will make the law more systematic, but rather that hidden undercurrents, new developments and competing doctrines are more likely to
penetrate our consciousness if all appeal cases are reported.8 7 How we evenexpanded literature depends more on historical factors
tually make use of this
than legal doctrine. 88
A final aspect of this report that bears examination are the transitional
provisions respecting judges as envisioned by the Committee. Two schemes
are suggested for staffing the new Juristic Section, yet both display a remarkable conservatism. Under both proposals, no judges who are not now members of the Court of Appeal could be named to the Juristic Section until all
current Justices of Appeal have been appointed. Although it may be beneficial to staff this new Court with a majority of experienced appellate justices
at the outset, there is no reason why all seven new positions must be so filled
and, a fortiori,there is no reason to defer to current members of the Court of
Appeal in future appointments. In fact, basing predictions on the length of
time it takes eight members of the Court of Appeal to resign or retire, it
seems as if it will be 1985 before anyone who is not now a member of the
Court of Appeal will take a seat on the Juristic Section. 9 The merit of this
particular transitional provision is, therefore, doubtful.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of court overcrowding is not a temporary phenomenon.
Moreover, it is not related solely to the fact of an increasing population. In
the last twenty years, as Canadian society has become much less homoge85A candid assessment of the role of casebook editor appears in J. Milner, Cases
and Materials on Contracts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) at x-xi.
86 My colleague, R. W. Kerr, has recently pointed out an aspect of this phenomenon. The question of the constitutionality of the Official Language Act of Manitoba,
R.S.M. 1970, c. 010, which is currently before the Manitoba courts in Forestv. Registrar
of the Court of Appeal, was first decided in Bertrand v. Dussault and Lavoie, an unreported County Court decision of Mr. Justice Prud'homme rendered in 1909. The latter
case has been totally ignored for almost seventy years. One other example worth noting
may be found in I. Macneil, Research in East African Law (1967), 3 East African
L. J. 47, n. 29, where a particularly horrendous instance of incomplete reporting is
documented.
87
In The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), Grant
Gilmore explains how Fuller and Purdue were able to discover such undercurrents by
thorough case-report research.
88
See G. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure (1961), 70 Yale LU. 1037;
and J. Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publicationof Appellate Court
Opinions (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 791.
89 Eight judges of the Court of Appeal retired during the years 1969-1977; eight
others retired between 1961 and 1969; a further eight between 1949 and 1961.
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nous, we have been experiencing an accelerating shift away from a social
structure predominantly organized upon a principle of shared committment
to one bound together by the legal principle. 0 As this second organizational
framework with formalized rules of duty and entitlement becomes dominant,
recourse to third party adjudication increases in popularity as a mechanism
for promoting an ordered society. Custom, authority, charisma, mediation,
superstition and deliberate resort to change gradually come to be viewed as
unimportant, or inefficacious human institutions. 91
What is particularly distressing about the Committee's Report is not the
fact that its principal recommendations are based on a "non-distinction" and
also probably will not achieve their desired result, but that it never attempts
to understand the causes of increased litigation. It is perhaps too much to
expect the Committee to undertake a social critique; 92 nevertheless, a recognition of these basic issues would have, at a minimum, compelled a more
thorough examination of the institutional role played by third party adjudication in Ontario. This alone would have constituted a significant contribution towards the development of a solution to the problem of court
overcrowding.

9
oAn explanation of these terms can be found in L. Fuller, "Two Principles of
Human Association," in J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds., Voluntary Associations,
Nomos XI (New York: Atherton Press, 1969) at 3-23.
9
1 See Aldisert, supra note 17; and Barton, supra note 9.
92 Cf. J. Mohr, Law and Society: From Proscriptionto Discovery (1973), 51 Can.
B. Rev. 7.

